12-17-2022, 10:22 AM
According as the substance (dravya) is viewed with regard to its different modes (paryāya), it may be described by the following propositions: 1) in a way it is (asti); 2) in a way it is not (nāsti); 3) in a way it is indescribable (avaktavya); 4) in a way it is and is not (asti-nāsti); and by the remaining three propositions: 5) in a way it is and is indescribable (asti-avaktavya); 6) in a way it is not and is indescribable (nāsti-avaktavya); and 7) in a way it is, is not and is indescribable (asti-nāsti-avaktavya).
Explanatory Note: The substance (dravya) is known through the seven limbs (saptabhańga) of assertion, the one-sided but relative method of comprehension (naya). Every object admits of a four-fold affirmative predication – svacatuÈÇaya – with reference to its own-substance (svadravya), own-space (svakÈetra), own-time (svakāla), and own-nature (svabhāva). Simultaneously, a four-fold negative predication is implied with regard to other-substance (paradravya), other-space (parakÈetra), other-time (parakāla),
and other-nature (parabhāva). The substance (dravya) is viewed not only with regard to own-substance (svadravya) but also with regard to other-substance (paradravya). The substance (dravya) is of the nature of asti with regard to its svacatuÈÇaya. It is of the nature of nāsti with regard to its paracatuÈÇaya. Since both, the affirmation (asti) and the negation (nāsti) cannot be expressed ‘simultaneously’, it is indescribable (avaktavya). Viewed sequentially, it is both, the affirmation and the negation (astināsti). Further, it can be asti-avaktavya, nāsti-avaktavya, and astināsti-avaktavya, depending on the point-of-view. This seven-fold mode of predication – saptabhańgī – with its partly meant and
partly non-meant affirmation (vidhi) and negation (niÈedha), qualified by the word ‘syāt’ (literally, ‘in some respect’; indicative of conditionality of predication) dispels any contradictions that can occur in thought. The viewpoints of absolute existence, oneness, permanence, and describability, and their opposites – absolute non-existence, manyness, non-permanence, and indescribability – corrupt the nature of reality while the use of the word ‘syāt’ (conditional, from a particular standpoint) to qualify the viewpoints makes these logically sustainable.
Explanatory Note: The substance (dravya) is known through the seven limbs (saptabhańga) of assertion, the one-sided but relative method of comprehension (naya). Every object admits of a four-fold affirmative predication – svacatuÈÇaya – with reference to its own-substance (svadravya), own-space (svakÈetra), own-time (svakāla), and own-nature (svabhāva). Simultaneously, a four-fold negative predication is implied with regard to other-substance (paradravya), other-space (parakÈetra), other-time (parakāla),
and other-nature (parabhāva). The substance (dravya) is viewed not only with regard to own-substance (svadravya) but also with regard to other-substance (paradravya). The substance (dravya) is of the nature of asti with regard to its svacatuÈÇaya. It is of the nature of nāsti with regard to its paracatuÈÇaya. Since both, the affirmation (asti) and the negation (nāsti) cannot be expressed ‘simultaneously’, it is indescribable (avaktavya). Viewed sequentially, it is both, the affirmation and the negation (astināsti). Further, it can be asti-avaktavya, nāsti-avaktavya, and astināsti-avaktavya, depending on the point-of-view. This seven-fold mode of predication – saptabhańgī – with its partly meant and
partly non-meant affirmation (vidhi) and negation (niÈedha), qualified by the word ‘syāt’ (literally, ‘in some respect’; indicative of conditionality of predication) dispels any contradictions that can occur in thought. The viewpoints of absolute existence, oneness, permanence, and describability, and their opposites – absolute non-existence, manyness, non-permanence, and indescribability – corrupt the nature of reality while the use of the word ‘syāt’ (conditional, from a particular standpoint) to qualify the viewpoints makes these logically sustainable.